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A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel After Montejo v. Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION

An injuredpedestrian, the victim of a hit-and-run collision, is
found bleeding on the side of the road. Based on the victim's
description of the automobile,police arrest businessman Sherman
McCoy, who is released on bail and formally indicted later that
week. McCoy immediately hires a lawyer, who calls the local
districtattorney to alert him that he will be representingMcCoy on
the charges.Later that night, Detectives Martin and Goldberg visit
McCoy at his home to "chat" about the case. Miranda warnings
are not administered.'
"The moreyou can tell us about where you were that night, the
better deal we'll be able to arrangefor you, " Detective Martin
tells McCoy. "You give us what we need, and who knows, maybe
we only chargeyou with reckless operation."2
"I don't know, " McCoy responds. "I think I shouldprobably
talk this over with my lawyerfirst."
"I can tell you exactly what your lawyer will say, " Detective
Martin explains. "Your lawyer is going to tell you not to make a
deal with us. But your lawyer's not facing jail time, is he?"
Detective Goldberg chimes in, explaining that McCoy's attorney
stands to make a lot of money if the case goes to trial.3
Detective Martin then tells McCoy about all of the evidence
that the police have gathered. "Look, we 've got three witnesses
who saw what happened; we've got skid marks that match the tires
on your car; and we've got traffic cameras from five different
angles that clearly show that you were the one driving the car that
night, " he explains. As it turns out, the detective is lying. Although
the police know that McCoy's car was involved in the accident,

Copyright 2010, by MICHAEL C. MIMS.
1. For a discussion of the Mirandawarnings, see infra Part II.B.
2. See Brief for Respondent at 7 n.5, Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986) (No. 84-1531), 1985 WL 669649 ("If you want to go up on murder one,
life imprisonment, that's up to you. Now we'll work a deal and plead to
something less and get two years, get out, that's your business. It's your
choice.").
3. See id ("I'll tell you what an attorney is gonna tell ya, an attorney is
gonna tell ya don't talk to police. I can tell you that right now. Don't talk to the
police. But, the attorney doesn't go to jail, does he? ... You know what the
attorney does when you say that, the attorney knows that that's going to get a
trial, even if he's appointed he gets paid by how much trial days.").
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they have no evidence indicating that McCoy was behind the
wheel.4
"This is an open and shut case, " Detective Goldberg explains.
"You're going to jail; everyone knows that. The only question is,
do you let us help you out and offer you some kind of deal, or do
you call up your attorney and help pad his wallet by letting this
drag on at trial?"
Okay, McCoy thinks to himself maybe if I give them just a
little something to go on, they won't come down so hard on me.
"I'll tell you what I know," McCoy responds. "I drove down that
street around the time of the accident; that must be how the traffic
cameras spotted me. But I never hit anyone with my car that
night."
The detectives leave the McCoy residence shortly thereafter
and head back to the office to tell their boss the good news.
They've just gathered the last piece of evidence needed to convict
Sherman McCoy.
Before 2009, both state and federal courts would have widely
agreed that the actions of the police in the above fact pattern, for
multiple reasons, constituted a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.5 However, after the United States
Supreme Court's recent ruling in Montejo v. Louisiana,6 which
overturned Michigan v. Jackson and its firmly established
protections of the right to counsel,7 the Sixth Amendment no
longer prohibits police from approaching a represented defendant
for post-indictment interrogation in the absence of counsel.
Furthermore, dicta in Montejo suggests that other elements of the
above scenario, such as the detectives' failure to administer
Miranda warnings and their use of false evidence, might also fall
short of a Sixth Amendment violation.9
Thus, Montejo represents a dramatic shift in the Court's
jurisprudence regarding the right to counsel. By eliminating most
meaningful distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel, the Court has denigrated the right to a fair trial
for criminal defendants, eliminated workable standards for law
4. See State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1245 n.26 (La. 2008), vacated by
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) ("After the detectives falsely
claim[ed] that forensic analysis can determine when he was in the home .. . Montejo
admitted that he entered the home and proceeded to relate his second version of the
crime. Both detectives conceded at trial that they misled Montejo.. ..
5. See infra Part V.B.
6. 129 S. Ct. 2079.
7. 475 U.S. 625, overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
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enforcement, and demonstrated a disturbingly activist disregard for
stare decisis. This Comment argues that Montejo was poorly
reasoned, will lead to alarming results, and should be limited by
state constitutions. To reach this end, Part II analyzes the history of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the rationale behind the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee, and the ways in which the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel differs from that of the Fifth
Amendment. Part III introduces Montejo, detailing the Supreme
Court's latest interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Finally, Part
IV discusses the implications of Montejo and analyzes a list of law
enforcement tactics that courts might now find permissible in light
of Montejo. In response to these observations, Part V proposes a
solution for Louisiana and other states that wish to best protect the
fundamental rights of their citizens.
II. BACKGROUND: SOURCES OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Because Montejo eliminated most meaningful distinctions
between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, it is
appropriate to study the history of those rights, the differences
between the two rights, and the ways the Court has recently
disregarded those differences.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Traditionally, several factors have distinguished the right to
counsel of the Sixth Amendment from that of the Fifth
Amendment. Such factors include the rationale behind the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the context in which the right
applies.
1. Rationale Behind the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The Supreme Court
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The full text of the Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
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has traditionally recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel serves two related goals: "(1) minimizing the imbalance of
our adversary system between the accused and the government
committed to prosecuting him, thereby (2) preserving the fairness
and integrity of criminal trials."" Because criminal defendants are
inherently less capable of coping with the legal process than their
governmental opponents, "the Framers afforded the accused an
equalizing presence intended to prevent outcomes more dependent
upon might than right."l 2 This equalizing presence promotes parity
between the government and the accused. 3 Such balance between
parties is desirable in a free society because the "very premise of
our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy
on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."l 4
Another significant theoretical basis of the Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel jurisprudence is the protection
against deliberate governmental interference with the privacy of
the attorney-client relationship.'s The Supreme Court elaborated
on this concern in 1985, holding in Maine v. Moulton:

11. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("The Sixth
Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it
envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967) (explaining that the basic thesis of Sixth Amendment cases is that the
help of a lawyer is essential to a fair trial and the maintenance of "our adversary
theory of criminal justice"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)
("The right to be heard would be ... of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. ... He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."); Meredith B. Halama,
Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a Mere
"ProphylacticRule, " 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1207, 1209 (citing Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985)) ("The right to the assistance of counsel . . . is

indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal
justice.").
12. James J. Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel
in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REv. 975, 981 (1986); see also Halama,
supra note 11, at 1209.
13. Tomkovicz, supranote 12, at 980.
14. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (quoting Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
15. ANDREW V. JEZIC ET AL., MARYLAND LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 20:3
(2009 ed. 2009), availableat Westlaw MDCONF s 20:3. See also the American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after
the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel
as a "medium" between him and the State. . . . [T]his

guarantee includes the State's affirmative obligation not to
act in a manner that circumvents the protections accorded
the accused by invoking this right. . . . [K]nowing
exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the
accused without counsel being present is as much a breach
of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the
assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such
an opportunity.16
Furthermore, the Court has noted that after the commencement
of adversary criminal proceedings, "[o]nce an accused has a
lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at
preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes
effect."' 7 Thus, the Sixth Amendment serves not only to ensure a
defendant's right to a fair trial, but also to protect the integrity of
the attorney-client relationship.
2. When the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Applies
Although a strict reading of the Sixth Amendment seems to
protect only the right to assistance at trial,18 the Court has
recognized over time that this guarantee encompasses a broader
scope of protection and has thus extended the right to counsel to
certain pretrial events. 19 Such application of the Sixth Amendment
is consistent with the modem criminal justice system. 20 When the
Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment, they "had little need to be
concerned with a right to counsel in pretrial proceedings because in
their time such proceedings were insignificant. Trial was the

authorized to do so by law or court order." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.2 (2010). The comments to Rule 4.2 further provide that:
When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a
government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring
the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication
does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to
establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.
Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 5.
16. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
17. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (referring to "criminal prosecutions").
19. Halama, supra note 11, at 1210; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at
982 n.32.
20. Halama, supra note 11, at 1210.
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primary battleground." 2 1 Today, however, "law enforcement
machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere

formality." 22
In the 1932 case Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
expanded the right to counsel to pretrial events for the first time,
holding:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of
their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when
consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation
were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid
of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much
entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.23
The Court's modem jurisprudence dictates a two-step analysis
to determine whether the protections of the Sixth Amendment
apply to a defendant. First, the Court analyzes whether the right
has "attached," 24 asking whether the state has committed itself to
prosecute, either "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information or arraignment."
Second, the Court
analyzes whether the particular proceeding is a "critical stage,"
asking whether it contains "procedures that would impair defense
on the merits if the accused [were] required to proceed without

counsel." 26
In the 1964 case Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the right to counsel may apply outside of the courtroom
during certain pretrial confrontations with the police. 27 In that case,
the Court held that government agents violated the Sixth
21. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 982 (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 310 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).
22. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
23. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
24. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
25. Id. at 689. In 2008, the Court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel may attach as early as "a criminal defendant's initial appearance
before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is
subject to restriction." Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592

(2008).
26. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975); see, e.g., Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that a preliminary hearing constitutes a
critical stage); Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (holding that a post-indictment lineup
constitutes a critical stage); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (holding that
an initial appearance constitutes a critical stage).
27. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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Amendment right to counsel of an indicted defendant when they
surreptitiously monitored his statements about the crime, which
were "deliberately elicited" by a government agent and in the
absence of counsel.2 8
Because admitting such statements could reduce a defendant's
trial to "no more than an appeal from the interrogation," 29 postindictment "deliberate elicitation" constitutes a "critical stage" that
requires the assistance of counsel. 3 0 Therefore, during
interrogation, much like at trial, the Sixth Amendment entitles
defendants to a lawyer's assistance in "advising, speaking for, and
shielding them, raising them to a level of knowledge, expertise,
and strength comparable to that of the state." 3 ' This entitlement
traditionally provided much broader protection than the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. 32
B. Ffth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment makes no specific mention of the right
to counsel.3 3 However, in Miranda v. Arizona,3 4 the Supreme
Court held that during custodial interrogation, the Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination calls for
"a protective shield against the state."35 The Court concluded that
an integral element of this protection is an entitlement to legal
assistance. 36 This right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation is vital to the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, the Court reasoned, because it ensures that an
individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains
unfettered, and it mitigates the dangers of coercion. 37 Because the
Miranda right is primarily an anti-compulsion safeguard,3 8 it
28.
29.
30.
United
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 206.
Halama, supra note 11, at 1212 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 226).
Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977)); see also
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 988.
Id. at 993-94.
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person . .. shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .

. ."

U.S.

CONST. amend. V.
34. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 988.
36. Id.
37. Halama, supra note 11, at 1213 (citing Miranda,384 U.S. at 469-70).
38. Under Miranda, a suspect must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
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focuses only on whether the suspect felt coerced to waive his
rights 39 and not upon deceptive police practices "occurring outside
of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him.AO
Furthermore, the Miranda right applies only when the suspect is
(1) in custody 41 and (2) under interrogation.
C. Diferent Rights, Different Standards: Waiving the Right to
Counsel
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has traditionally
recognized the distinctions between both the history and the
rationale of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel.
Given these distinctions, the Court has historically applied
different standards when evaluating the validity of a Fifth or Sixth
Amendment waiver. A court's decision to admit or suppress a
confession often hinges on the validity of this waiver.
1. Traditional Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The traditional standard for evaluating the validity of a Sixth
Amendment waiver originated in the 1938 Supreme Court case
Johnson v. Zerbst.43 In that case, the Court rejected the State's
claim that the defendant waived his right to counsel at trial, noting
that courts should "indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and should not
"presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."" Thus,
the Court defined a valid waiver as "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right."AS In the 1975 case Faretta v.
Calhfornia,4 6 the Supreme Court elaborated on this standard. Citing
Zerbst, the Court noted that in order for a defendant to validly
waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial, the state must

an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
39. Halama, supra note 11, at 1214.
40. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 424-28 (1986).
41. To determine whether a suspect is in custody, courts ask whether "a
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004).
42. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980); infra note 236.

43.

304 U.S. 458 (1938).

44. Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).

45. Id.
46. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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make the defendant "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."' 47
Although Faretta involved a waiver at trial rather than
interrogation, "[i]t makes sense to apply analogous requirements in
pretrial Massiah contexts because the ultimate risks of forgoing
counsel in those situations are similar in nature to those
immediately encountered in Faretta settings.'48 Indeed, the
Supreme Court once noted that the strict Zerbst-Farettastandard
''applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel
whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings.'A9
2. Traditional Waiver of the Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
In Miranda, the Court purported to adopt the Zerbst standard
for the Fifth Amendment, holding that a defendant can waive his
Miranda rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently."so However, in practice, the Court has
employed a low standard for waiver; because the purpose of
Miranda is to dispel the pressures of a police-dominated
atmosphere, the Court has focused almost entirely on the
voluntariness of the waiver.5 1 Unlike the traditional Zerbst-Faretta
standard, the standard for a valid Fifth Amendment waiver does
not require the state to provide a suspect with much information
about the implications of his decision. 52 The Supreme Court
elaborated on this point in Moran v. Burbine, holding:
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely
on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he
could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was
aware of the State's intention to use his statements to
secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver
is valid as a matter of law.5 3

47. Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 279 (1942)). In the case, the Court found a valid waiver, noting that the
defendant fully understood the judge's warnings that such a waiver was a
mistake and could lead to adverse consequences. Id.
48. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1001 n.103.
49. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-40 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 237 (1967)).
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 475 (1966).
51. Halama,supra note 11, at 1217.
52. Id.
53. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1986).
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Thus, while the Court maintains that a Mirandawaiver must be
knowing and intelligent, in reality the Court will uphold the
validity of a waiver "as long as the warnings are given and the
suspect exhibits no overt signs of a lack of capacity to understand
them.",54 Under this relaxed standard, the Court has found a valid
waiver when the suspect was not aware of the crime under
investigation, 5 when the suspect was unaware that police were
thwarting the efforts of his attorney to contact him, 56 and when the
suspect mistakenly believed that only written confessions could be
used against him in court.5 7
Although generally imposing relaxed standards for a valid Fifth
Amendment waiver, the Supreme Court has created an absolute
rule to prevent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation
once the accused actually invokes his right to counsel. Under
Edwards v. Arizona, once police administer a Miranda warning, if
the suspect requests the assistance of counsel, interrogation must
stop; any subsequent waiver made in response to police-initiated
interrogation will be presumed invalid. 9 The Supreme Court
extended the Edwards cut-off rule in Minnick v. Mississippi,
holding that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he cannot
validly waive that right unless he initiates contact or is assisted by
his attorney.60 Such protections are "designed to prevent police
from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted
Miranda rights" and are consistent with the Fifth Amendment's
role in preventing compulsory self-incrimination.61

54. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers,
Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of InterrogationProtections, 49 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 1007, 1063 (1988).
55. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 577 (1987).
56. Moran, 475 U.S. at 424.
57. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 (1987).
58. Halama, supra note 11, at 1218 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.

477 (1981)).

59. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. The Edwards rule applies only when a
defendant makes an "unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel";
otherwise, "the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him." Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (holding that "maybe I should talk to a
lawyer" does not constitute an Edwards invocation); see also Maryland v.
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (holding that the Edwards cut-off rule ceases to
apply if there is a break in custody lasting 14 days or longer).
60. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
61. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
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D. Recent Intertwinement of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
The Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel were
traditionally thought to promote different goals. 62 The historical
rationale was that the "Sixth Amendment exists to maintain the
integrity of our adversarial system as a whole; the Miranda right
exists solely to protect suspects from being compelled to waive
their Fifth Amendment rights in custodial interrogations." 63 Given
these distinctions, the two rights traditionally arose at different
times and carried different standards of waiver. 64 However, the
Supreme Court "has, in recent years, largely ignored the
differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel."6 5
1. Jackson: Confusing the Purposeof the Sixth Amendment
Ironically, the merging of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
began with a majority opinion by Justice Stevens that was intended
to promote the protections of the right to counsel.6 6 In the 1986
case Michigan v. Jackson, the Supreme Court established a cut-off
rule that prevented the interrogation of defendants in certain Sixth
Amendment scenarios.67 Drawing an analogy to the Fifth
Amendment case Edwards, the Court "based much of its opinion
on the 'additional safeguards [that] are necessary when the accused
asks for counsel,' rather than the importance of counsel once
adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced."
In Jackson, the defendant requested at his arraignment that the
court appoint counsel to represent him.6 9 But before the
defendant's court-appointed attorney could reach him, police
interrogated the defendant and obtained a confession.7 0 The Court
concluded that this confession was obtained in violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, holding that "if
police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an
arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any
62. See supra Part II.A-B.
63. Halama, supra note 11, at 1214.
64. See supra Part II.C.
65. Halama, supra note 11, at 1223.
66. Id. at 1224.
67. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), overruled by Montejo
v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
68. Halama, supra note 11, at 1224 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636).
69. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627.

70. Id.
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waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated
interrogation is invalid."7 1 Although the Court noted that its
decision did not hinge on Jackson's assertion, 72 the crux of the
opinion would later be read to rest on the fact that the defendant
had invoked his Sixth Amendment right by formal request. 73
Therefore, while "the result of Jackson is logically sound, the
Court's reliance on Edwards and invocation ultimately served to
straightjacket Sixth Amendment waiver inquiries into Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence."7 4
2. Patterson: Confusing the Waiver Standards
In the 1988 case Patterson v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
rejected the notion "that the Sixth Amendment is 'superior' to the
Fifth or that it should be 'more difficult' to waive."' In that case,
the defendant had been indicted but had not requested or been
appointed counsel." Police initiated contact with the defendant,
obtained a Miranda waiver, and conducted an interrogation that
resulted in the defendant's confession.7 7 The Court held that
although the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights had attached,
waiver of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights was sufficient to
demonstrate a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.78 The Court reasoned that the Miranda warnings provided
the defendant with the essential substance of his Sixth Amendment
rights and that his waiver therefore qualified as "knowing and
intelligent."7 9 Although Pattersonallowed for a valid waiver of the
right to counsel during post-indictment interrogation, the decision
remained consistent with Jackson, as Patterson'sholding appeared
to be limited to Sixth Amendment scenarios in which a defendant
had not requested or obtained an attorney.s0

71. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
72. See id. at 633 n.6 (noting that, although the right to counsel does not
turn on the defendant's request, this request is one "extremely important fact in
considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated
interrogation").
73. Halama, supra note 11, at 1225 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 291 (1988)).
74. Id.; see infra note 110 (discussing lower courts' different interpretations
of Jackson).
75. Halama, supra note 11, at 1221 (quoting Patterson,487 U.S. at 297).
76. Patterson,487 U.S. at 298-99.
77. Id. at 288.
78. Id. at 296-97.
79. Id. at 293-96.
80. See id. at 290 n.3.
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Jackson and Patterson are two examples of the Supreme
Court's recent intertwinement of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel. Jackson established the notion that the
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel rely on some
sort of invocation by the defendant, just as in Fifth Amendment
contexts.8 ' Patterson expanded on this logic, holding that absent
such invocation, a Miranda waiver constitutes a valid waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, just as in Fifth Amendment
contexts. 82 And in 2009, the Court took Jackson and Pattersonone
step further in Montejo, a case that further eliminated the
distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel.
III. MONTEJO V.LouISIANA: THE SUPREME COURT'S MOST RECENT
DENIGRATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In Montejo, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court went out of
its way to redefine the standards for waiving the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. However, such action was unwarranted, as
indicated by a close analysis of the facts of Montejo, the holding of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court.
A. Facts of the Case
On September 6, 2002, police arrested Jesse Jay Montejo for
the murder of Lewis Ferrari. * The police brought Montejo before
a judge on September 10 for his "72-hour hearing," an initial
appearance required by Louisiana law for the purpose of
appointing counsel. 84 Although this hearing was not transcribed,
the minute entry indicated that the court appointed an attorney to
represent Montejo. However, the record did not indicate whether
Montejo said anything in response to the appointment of counsel,
and the state later alleged that the defendant stood in "mute
acquiescence" at the hearing.8 6 Later that day, before Montejo had
the chance to meet his attorney, the police approached the
defendant at the prison and requested that he take a ride with them
81. See supraPart II.D.1.
82. See supra Part II.D.2.
83. State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La. 2008), vacated by Montejo v.
Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
84. Id. at 1258-59 (citing LA. CODE CIUM. PROC. ANN. art. 230.1 (Supp.
2010)).

85. Id
86. Id. at 1259.
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to help locate the murder weapon.8 7 The police administered a
Mirandawarning, and Montejo agreed to accompany them on their
ti,
sgeto
h
88
trip. During this trip, at the suggestion of the police, Montejo
wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim's widow. 89 At
trial, the court admitted this letter over objections by the defense. 90
On March 9, 2005, a jury convicted Montejo of first-degree
murder, and he was sentenced to death. 91
B. Decision of the LouisianaSupreme Court
On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, Montejo contended
that the district court erred in admitting the letter of apology,
arguing that police obtained the letter in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel under Jackson.92 Montejo argued that
because the court had appointed an attorney, Jackson barred the
police from approaching him for questioning. 9 3 The Louisiana
Supreme Court disagreed.9 4 Citing one of its previous decisions,
State v. Carter,95 and a decision of the United States Fifth Circuit,
Montoya v. Collins,96 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
"[s]omething more than the mere mute acquiescence in the
appointment of counsel is necessary to show the defendant has
asserted his right to counsel [to] sufficiently trigger the enhanced
protection provided by Michigan v. Jackson's prophylactic rule." 97
Because there was no indication that Montejo said anything at all
when counsel was appointed, the Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that "although his right to counsel had attached, he did
not assert his right to counsel such that the prophylactic rule of
Michigan v. Jackson would invalidate any waiver he would later
make."
Therefore, the court reasoned, "the only remaining
inquiry is whether his Sixth Amendment waiver was knowing,
intelligent and voluntary." 99 Montejo did not address this issue on
87. Id. at 1249.
88. Id. at 1261. At trial, Montejo testified that the police misled him by
telling him that the court had not appointed him an attorney. Id. at 1261-62.
89. Id. at 1249.
90. Id. at 1258.
91. Id. at 1240-41.
92. Id. at 1258-59.
93. Id. at 1260-61.
94. Id.
95. 664 So. 2d 367, 383 (La. 1995).
96. 955 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1992).
97. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1260-61 (alterations in original) (quoting
Carter,664 So. 2d at 383) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id at 1261.
99. Id.
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appeal, and in a brief discussion, the Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that his signing of a Miranda waiver constituted a valid
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 00 Therefore, the
court affirmed Montejo's conviction. 10
C. Decision of the United States Supreme Court
1. OralArgument
On October 1, 2008, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to answer the following question: "When an indigent
defendant's right to counsel has attached and counsel has been
appointed, must the defendant take additional affirmative steps to
'accept' the appointment in order to secure the protections of the
Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation
without counsel present?" 2 Although both sides addressed only
this narrow question in their briefs, at oral argument Justice Alito
suggested that the Court examine a much larer issue-whether
the Court should overturn Jackson altogether. 3 This suggestion
arose entirely on the Court's own initiative, as not even the State
questioned the validity of Jackson's cut-off rule.104 Nevertheless,
on March 30, 2009, the Court directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs to address whether Jackson should be
overturned.' 0 5
100. Id at 1261-62 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988)).
101. Id. at 1265.
102. Supreme Court Docket, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009)
(No. 07-1529), availableat http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/07-01529qp.pdf.
103. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 071529).
104. See generally Brief for Respondent, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 071529), 2008 WL 5328196.
105. Supreme Court Docket, supra note 102. Upon the Supreme Court's
suggestion that Jackson be reexamined, the newly elected Obama
administration, by way of Solicitor General Elena Kagan, filed an amicus brief
on behalf of the United States, arguing for Jackson to be overturned. See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling Michigan v.
Jackson, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL 1019983
[hereinafter United States Amicus Brief]. The Obama administration's
involvement in Montejo disappointed and surprised some civil liberties
advocates who viewed the administration's stance in the case as inconsistent
with much of Obama's campaign rhetoric and his background as a
Constitutional Law professor. See, e.g., Matthew Rothschild, Obama Needs to
Do More than Swap Liberal Justices, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 27, 2009,
http://www.progressive.org/wx052709.html ("While everyone's talking about
how the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor may affect the Supreme Court, we need
to keep our eye on the current court-and on Obama's arguments in there....
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2. Decision of the Court
On May 26, 2009, the Court announced its 5-4 decision.106
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the Court's analysis
by noting the different approaches that states take in appointing
counsel to indigent defendants. o7 In many states such as
Michigan-the state "whose scheme produced the factual
background for [the] Court's decision in Michigan v. Jackson"courts require that the defendant formally request counsel before
appointment is made. 08 The Court noted, however, that "many
States follow other practices. In some two dozen, the appointment
of counsel is automatic upon a finding of indigency."lo The Court
commented that nothing in Jackson indicated "whether [the Court
was] then aware that not all States require that a defendant
affirmatively request counsel before one is appointed."'"0

Amazingly, Obama's Justice Department argued in favor of the [Montejo]
decision that Justice Scalia handed down.... Obama needs to do more than just
swap one liberal justice for another. He needs to make sure that his Justice
Department goes into the Supreme Court to uphold the Bill of Rights, not
undermine it.").
106. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito. Id.
107. Id. at 2083.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae The National Legal Aid & Defender
Ass'n & The Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia in Support of
Petitioner at 29, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2008 WL 5026649).
110. Id. at 2083-84. This was not a meaningful distinction under most states'
interpretations of Jackson. To find a valid Jackson invocation, only a "minority
of courts require[d] a more exacting standard" such as the standard followed by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Montejo. JEZIC, supra note 15, § 20:15 (2008
ed. 2008). On the other hand, the majority of courts in "automatic appointment"
states had adopted a much more workable standard, holding that Jackson's cutoff rule could be triggered by something less than an express request for the
appointment of counsel. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 213 F.3d 1206,
1213 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A] defendant invokes the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as a matter of law when (1) the defendant retains counsel on an ongoing
basis to assist with a pending criminal investigation, (2) the government knows,
or should know, that the defendant has ongoing legal representation relating to
the subject of that investigation, and (3) the eventual indictment brings charges
precisely anticipated by the scope of the pre-indictment investigation.");
Fleming v. Kemp, 837 F.2d 940, 947 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant's
statement at arraignment that he wanted to obtain his own attorney was an
assertion of his right to counsel); Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir.
1986); Bradford v. State, 927 S.W.2d 329, 335 (Ark. 1996) (holding that
appointment of a lawyer without defendant's knowledge was an invocation of
the right to counsel); State v. Dagnall, 612 N.W.2d 680, 695 (Wis. 2000)
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The Court observed that under the approach of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, these differences in states' laws would result in
different applications of the Jackson rule.' In "appointment by
request" states, defendants are required to assert their desire for an
attorney before one will be appointed; therefore, in these states,
any defendant who is represented by court-appointed counsel
would have already invoked the Jackson cut-off rule.112 On the
other hand, in "automatic appointment" states, where defendants
are not required to formally request counsel, it would be more
difficult to determine whether a defendant has invoked Jackson's
cut-off rule, a rule that would prevent police from approaching the
defendant for interrogation.11 3 The Court noted that the approach
of the Louisiana Supreme Court would make it much more
difficult for defendants in "automatic appointment" states to
invoke Jackson's cut-off rule. 1' 4 According to the Court, such a
distinction would represent a "sort of hollow formalism [that] is
out of place in a doctrine that purports to serve as a practical
safeguard for defendants' rights."
After rejecting the Louisiana Supreme Court's approach, the
Court turned its attention to Montejo's proposal-eliminate the
distinctions among the states by extending Jackson's cut-off rule
not only to defendants who expressly request counsel, but also to
defendants who obtain counsel through automatic appointment by
the court or otherwise.1 1 6 The Court agreed that Montejo's
approach, unlike that of the Louisiana Supreme Court, would
provide a workable method of applying Jackson in both
"appointment by request" states and "automatic appointment"
states.11 7 However, the Court ultimately rejected this approach,
concluding that such a rule was "entirely untethered from the
original rationale of Jackson." 8 The Court made this conclusion
despite precedent from lower courtsl 9 and the United States

(holding that if the authorities are aware that the defendant has obtained an
attorney, the defendant may validly invoke the right to counsel without the need
to tell the police that he has an attorney).
111. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2083-84.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2084.
116. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2008
WL 4948399 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990)).
117. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2088.
118. Id. at 2085.
119. See supranote 110.
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Supreme Court' 20 that supported a broader interpretation of
Jackson. The Court did not address these lower court holdings and
dismissed the cases cited by Montejo as unhelpful dicta.'21
120. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 24-32. Citing Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), Montejo noted:
Pattersoninvolved a defendant who had neither requested a lawyer nor
had one appointed for him. The Court held that the police could
interrogate a defendant under those circumstances provided that the
defendant waived his right to an attorney under Miranda. This Court
took pains to observe, however, that it was "a matter of some
significance" that Patterson was not "an accused [who] has a lawyer."
For once an accused has a lawyer, "a distinct set of constitutional
safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship takes effect."
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 24 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Patterson,487 U.S. at 290 n.3). Citing Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986), Montejo noted:
In that case, a criminal suspect whose Sixth Amendment rights had not
yet attached was interrogated while being kept ignorant of the fact that
a lawyer his family had obtained to represent him was trying to reach
him .... The Court held that such conduct was permissible because ...
[the suspect's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached. But
the Court could not have been clearer that such interrogation is
impermissible once the Sixth Amendment right attaches, even with a
Miranda waiver. For "once the right has attached, it follows that the
police may not interfere with the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act
as a 'medium' between [the suspect] and the State during
interrogation."
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 27 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Moran, 475 U.S. at 428). Citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990),
Montejo noted that in that case:
[T]he Court found that the protections of Jackson were triggered by the
appointment of counsel at Harvey's initial arraignment, and did not
attribute any additional significance to a request for counsel. As the
Court phrased it, "once a defendant obtains or even requests counsel ...
analysis of the waiver issue changes" and Jackson applies.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 25 (quoting Harvey, 494 U.S. at 352).
121. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2087-88. For the language of Patterson, see
supra note 120. The Court labeled the above language of that case as nonprobative dictum, reasoning that because the Patterson Court cited Moulton for
the above assertion and because Moulton's actual holding did not relate to a
waiver issue, Patterson's language could not have been intended to apply to
waivers. The Court made this conclusion in spite of the fact that Patterson was a
case explicitly relating to waivers and failed to explain what else Patterson
could have been referring to when it referenced "a distinct set of constitutional
safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship."
Patterson,487 U.S. at 290 n.3. For the language of Moran, see supra note 120.
The Court similarly stated that the above language of that case did not advance
Montejo's argument because Moran involved the question of whether the Sixth
Amendment had attached, "not the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver."
Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2087-88. However, in making this assertion, the
Montejo Court ignored the fact that the only reason Moran discussed whether
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In deciding that Jackson did not automatically apply to all
represented defendants, the Court analyzed both the language and
the history of the case. 22 The Court noted that Jackson's holding
specifically referred to defendants who had requested counsel, as
opposed to defendants who had been appointed counsel
automatically by the court. 123 Further, the Court pointed out that
the Jackson cut-off rule was expressly created as an analogy to the
Edwards cut-off rule, which requires invocation by the suspect.124
The Court explained that the logic behind Edwards and Jackson
was the presumption that "'suspects who assert their right to
counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily' in subsequent
interactions with police." 125 Therefore, the Court reasoned, it
would be inappropriate to apply the cut-off rule to all represented
defendants because Edwards and Jackson were "meant to prevent
police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about
their rights, but a defendant who never asked for counsel has not
yet made up his mind in the first instance."l26
Therefore, favoring neither the approach of the Louisiana
Supreme Court nor Montejo's proposal, the Court addressed the
option that Justice Alito suggested at oral argument-cure
Jackson's "practical deficiencies" by overturning the case
altogether.12 7 Disposing of Jackson's cut-off rule would be an
effective way to eliminate the "arbitrary and anomalous
distinctions between defendants in different States," the Court
reasoned. 128
Having already declared that Jackson was "unworkable in
more than half the States of the Union," the Court addressed the
strength of Jackson's reasoning to determine whether overturning

the Sixth Amendment had attached was because the Court had already
concluded that if it had attached, the waiver would have been invalid. See supra
note 120. For the language of Harvey, see supra note 120. The Montejo Court
concluded that the above language referring to obtaining a lawyer could not
have meant what it said: "[E]lsewhere in the same opinion, we explained that
Jackson applies 'after a defendant requests assistance of counsel,' 'when a
suspect charged with a crime requests counsel outside the context of
interrogation,' and to 'suspects who assert their right to counsel.' The accuracy
of the 'obtains' language is thus questionable." Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 208788 (citations omitted) (quoting Harvey, 494 U.S. at 349-50).
122. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085-88.
123. Id. at 2085.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2086 (quoting Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350).
126. Id. at 2087.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2083, 2088-89.
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the case would be appropriate.12 9 The Court noted that when it
"creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional
right, the relevant 'reasoning' is the weighing of the rule's benefits
against its costs."130 Addressing the benefits of the Jackson rule,
the Court began by stating what it perceived to be the purpose of
the rule: "[To preclude the State from badgering defendants into
waiving their previously asserted rights."03 1
With this in mind, the Court posed a question: Without
Jackson, how many badgering-induced confessions would be
erroneously admitted at trial?' 3 "The answer is few if any. The
principal reason is that the Court has already taken substantial
other, overlapping measures toward the same end."l 33 The Court
then described the "three layers of prophylaxis"l 34 that work
toward that end:
Under [Miranda] . . . any suspect subject to custodial

interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he
so requests, and to be advised of that right. Under
[Edwards] . . . once such a defendant 'has invoked his

right to have counsel present,' interrogation must stop.
And under [Minnick] . . . no subsequent interrogation may

take place until counsel is present .... 135
In the Court's view, the Miranda-Edwards-Minnickline of
cases provides sufficient protection of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, for "a defendant who does not want
to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as
much when he is first approached and given the Miranda
warnings."1 36 The Court conceded that the Miranda-EdwardsMinnick line of cases was based on the Fifth Amendment;
however, it argued that this line of cases also provides sufficient
protection against police badgering in Sixth Amendment contexts
and that, therefore, "Jackson is simply superfluous."' 3 7 Thus, the
Court concluded that "Jackson was policy driven, and if that policy
129. Id. at 2089.
130. Id. (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
131. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991); Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2090.
135. Id. at 2089-90 (citations omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484 (1981)) (citing Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153; Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 484 (1966)).
136. Id. at 2090.
137. Id.
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is being adequately served through other means, there is no reason
to retain its rule." 138
The Court then addressed the costs of Jackson, first noting that
the "principal cost of applying any exclusionary rule 'is, of course
letting guilty and possibly dangerous criminals go free."'l3
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the rule often prevents police
from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions, and "[w]ithout
these confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals
unpunished." 40 The Court concluded that these "are not negligible
costs, and in our view the Jackson Court gave them too short
shrift."'41 Finding that these substantial costs outweighed the
marginal benefits of Jackson, the Court expressly declared that
"Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled." 42
Having dispensed with Jackson, the Court remanded the case
so that Montejo could pursue two alternative avenues of relief that
the Louisiana Supreme Court did not originally address.143 First,
Montejo could argue that he invoked his right to counsel when the
police approached him for questioning, meaning the cut-off rule of
Edwards should have applied.14 4 Second, Montejo could "press
any claim he might have that his Sixth Amendment waiver was not
knowing and voluntary, [e.g.,] his argument that the waiver was
invalid because it was based on misrepresentations by police as to
whether he had been appointed a lawyer."l 4 5 The Court concluded
that those two matters "have heightened importance in light of our

opinion today."

46

138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009)).
140. Id. at 2091.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2091-92 ("Montejo understandably did not pursue an Edwards
objection, because Jackson served as the Sixth Amendment analogy to Edwards
and offered broader protections.").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2092 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1986)); see
supra note 88.
146. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092. On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that Montejo was precluded from raising the above objections, explaining
that "[a] new basis for an objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."
State v. Montejo, No. 2006-KA-1807, 2010 WL 2011552, at *23 (La. May 11,
2010) (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 841 (2008)). Additionally, the
court held that even if the admission of the confession letter violated Montejo's
right to counsel, such error was harmless because the letter was cumulative of
other properly admitted evidence. Id.
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3. DissentingOpinionl47
Justice Stevens-joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer-began his dissent by declaring that the majority's ruling
"rests on a misinterpretation of Jackson's rationale and a gross
undervaluation of the rule of stare decisis."l 48 The dissent critiqued
the majority's reasons for overturning Jackson, arguing that the
Court acted "on its own initiative ... to correct a 'theoretical and
doctrinal' problem of its own imagining." 1 49 The dissent contended
that Jackson was workable even in "automatic appointment" states,
for if "a defendant is entitled to protection from police-initiated
interrogation under the Sixth Amendment when he merely requests
a lawyer, he is even more obviously entitled to such protection
when he has secured a lawyer."' 5 0
The dissent claimed that the majority's decision stemmed from
its erroneous assumption "that Jackson's protective rule was
intended to 'prevent police from badgering defendants into
changing their minds about their rights,"' therefore leading the
Court to conclude that Jackson provided protection that was
already secured by Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 1 5' Rejecting
this reasoning, the dissent noted that "Jackson relied primarily on
cases discussing the broad protections guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel-not its Fifth Amendment
counterpart."l52 Further, the dissent noted that Jackson emphasized
147. Justice Alito agreed with the majority opinion in full, but wrote a
separate concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, to criticize the dissent's
argument that stare decisis should have controlled the case. Montejo, 129 S. Ct.
at 2092-94 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito claimed that the Supreme Court
showed an equally offensive disregard for stare decisis in a recent decision that
bolstered the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal defendants. See Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (rejecting a broad interpretation of New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and holding that police are authorized to
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest "only when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search"). Justice Alito thus concluded that the "treatment of stare
decisis in Gant fully supports the decision in the present case." Montejo, 129 S.
Ct. at 2094 (Alito, J., concurring).
148. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 2095 (quoting id. at 2085 (majority opinion)).
150. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that this argument was
consistent with the Court's earlier interpretations of Jackson. Id. (citing
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 290 n.3 (1988)). See supra note 120 for the relevant language of Harvey
and Patterson.
151. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2087
(majority opinion)).
152. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to 'protec[t] the
unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary,' by
giving him 'the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between
him[self] and the State."'" The dissent concluded that "although
the rules adopted in Edwards and Jackson are similar, Jackson did
not rely on the reasoning of Edwards but remained firmly rooted in
the unique protections afforded to the attorney-client relationship

by the Sixth Amendment."l 54
After pointing out the above rationales of Jackson, the dissent
argued that "[o]nce Jackson is placed in its proper Sixth
Amendment context the majority's justifications for overruling the
decision crumble." 15 With this in mind, the dissent addressed the
majority's stare decisis analysis. 56 Regarding the reasoning of
Jackson, the dissent rejected the majority's balancing test, arguing
that it depended entirely on the Court's "misunderstanding of
Jackson as a rule designed to prevent police badgering."15 7
Next, the dissent addressed workability, noting that the
majority reframed the relevant inquiry, "asking not whether the
Jackson rule as applied for the past quarter century has proved
easily administrable, but instead whether the Louisiana Supreme
Court's cramped interpretation of that rule is practically
workable."1 5 8 If the majority had asked the former question, the
dissent argued, it would have found "that Jackson's bright-line rule
has provided law enforcement officers with clear guidance,
allowed prosecutors to quickly and easily assess whether
confessions will be admissible in court, and assisted judges in
determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights have
been violated by police interrogation."' 59

153. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
631-32 (1985), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2097.
156. Id. at 2097-98.
157. Id. at 2097.
158. Id.; see also supra note 110 (discussing lower courts' different
interpretations of Jackson).
159. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae Larry D. Thompson, William Sessions, et
al., in Support of Petitioner, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL
1007118 [hereinafter Thompson Briefj). The dissent also commented that
"[fjurther supporting the workability of the Jackson rule is the fact that it aligns
with the professional standards and norms that already govern the behavior of
police and prosecutors." Id. at 2098 n.4 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010)). For the text of Rule 4.2, see supra note 15.
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The dissent then critiqued the majority's position that
Montejo's signing of a Miranda waiver constituted a valid waiver
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 160 Although the dissent
disagreed with Patterson's holding,' 6 1 it noted that even in
Patterson, the Court recognized that "because the Sixth
Amendment's protection of the attorney-client relationship . . .
extends beyond Miranda's protection of the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel . . . there will be cases where a waiver which

would be valid under Miranda will not suffice for Sixth
Amendment purposes."l62 Montejo is such a case, the dissent
reasoned, for given Montejo's "status as a represented criminal
defendant, the Miranda warnings given to him by police were
insufficient to permit him to make a knowing waiver of his Sixth
Amendment rights." 63 The dissent argued that when a defendant
has already been appointed counsel, informing him that he has the
right to the appointment of counsel "is more likely to confound
than enlighten."'1' The dissent noted that "it is imperative that a
defendant possess 'a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it' before his waiver is deemed valid."l 6 5 Therefore, the dissent
reasoned, because "the administration of Miranda warnings was
insufficient to ensure Montejo understood the Sixth Amendment
right he was being asked to surrender, the record in this case
provides no basis for concluding that Montejo validly waived his
right to counsel, even in the absence of Jackson's enhanced

protections."'

66

160. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2100 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. Regarding Patterson's holding, Justice Stevens reasoned that
because
Miranda warnings do not hint at the ways in which a lawyer might
assist her client during conversations with the police, I remain
convinced that the warnings prescribed in Miranda . .. are inadequate

to inform an unrepresented, indicted defendant of his Sixth Amendment
right to have a lawyer present at all critical stages of a criminal
prosecution.
Id.
162. Id (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 297 n.9 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
163. Idat2100n.6.
164. Id. at 2101.
165. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986)) (citing Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
166. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE SIxTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFTER

MONTEJO
The Montejo Court overturned Jackson and held that the Sixth
Amendment does not prevent police from approaching a defendant
for interrogation, even when that defendant has secured courtappointed counsel.16 7 As the dissent in Montejo noted, this decision
resulted from the Court's misunderstanding of "Jackson's
underlying rationale and the constitutional interests the decision
sought to protect."1 6 8 As discussed below, the Court's decision
undermines the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, legitimizes several forms of police conduct that were
previously thought to be unconstitutional, and jeopardizes the
future validity of other fundamental pieces of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.
A. Montejo Undermines the Protectionsof the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel
The most unsettling element of the Court's ruling in Montejo is
its complete disregard for the traditional rationale behind the Sixth
Amendment. 169 Unlike the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
recognized in Miranda, the primary function of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is to ensure a defendant's right to a
fair trial by putting him on a level playing field with the
prosecutor.' This rationale is not necessarily more important than
the Fifth Amendment anti-compulsion rationale, but it is more
complex; therefore, waiving the right to counsel in a Sixth
Amendment setting should require a greater standard of knowledge
from the defendant.' 7 1 The Supreme Court has recognized this
greater knowledge requirement for defendants who wish to waive
the right to counsel in a trial setting.172 It makes sense to apply
analogous requirements in post-indictment interrogation contexts
"because the ultimate risks of forgoing counsel in those situations

167. See supra.PartIII.
168. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2096 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. See supra Part II.A.1.
170. See supra Part II.A. 1.
171. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1056 n.306 ("Because of the difference in
the character of the sixth amendment guarantee and the consequent different
significance of a decision to forgo sixth amendment counsel, a defendant must
possess greater knowledge to make a valid sixth amendment decision.").
172. See supra Part II.A.1.
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are similar in nature to those immediately encountered in [trial]

settings."l 73
Instead, under Montejo, police need only obtain a valid
Miranda waiver to conduct a post-indictment interrogation of a
defendant.174 As the dissent in Montejo noted, because the
Miranda warnings were crafted as a safeguard against selfincrimination, although they apprise defendants of their right to
remain silent, they "do not hint at the ways in which a lawyer
might assist her client during conversations with the police.' 7 5
This is especially important in Sixth Amendment contexts because
"[w]ithout full information concerning the right to counsel, an
accused's decision to forgo that right cannot constitute the
assertion of independence that is a prerequisite to a constitutionally
acceptable waiver, that is, it is not a true choice to stand against the
state without equalization." 76
Furthermore, with regard to the actual language of the Miranda
warnings, informing a defendant of his right to obtain courtappointed counsel when that defendant "has already secured
Thus, the
counsel is more likely to confound than enlighten."
importance of complying with a Miranda warning might not seem
clear to a defendant who is under the impression that he is already
being represented and believes "that counsel, once secured, may be
reasonably relied upon as a medium between the accused and the
power of the State." 7 8
Additionally, the Montejo Court exaggerated the protections of
Miranda,alleging that "a defendant who does not want to speak to
the police without counsel present need only say as much."' 9 Such
a view ignores the realities of modern police interrogation. so

173. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1001 n.103; see also Patterson v. Illinois,
487 U.S. 285, 308 n.5 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Respondent, and the
United States as amicus curiae, argue that the comprehensive inquiry required
by Faretta v. California should not be extended to pretrial waivers because the
role of counsel . . . is more important at trial. I reject the premise that a lawyer's

skills are more likely to sit idle at a pretrial interrogation than at trial. Both
events require considerable experience and expertise and I would be reluctant to
rank one over the other." (citation omitted)).
174. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2092 (2009).
175. Id. at 2100 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1055.
177. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2098.
179. Id. at 2090 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
180. For example, in Montejo, during a pre-indictment interrogation, the
police repeatedly lied to Montejo about finding DNA evidence linking him to
the crime. Then, in response to demands for the location of the murder weapon,
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Empirical studies consistently show that about 80% of suspects
waive their right to counsel after police administer Miranda
warnings.
Common police tactics used to obtain such waivers

Montejo invoked his right to counsel but quickly retracted his request as
follows:
Montejo: "I would like to answer no more questions unless I
am in front of a lawyer."
Captain Hall: "Good enough." (exits)
Montejo: "Now,

...

"

Detective Morse: "You are under arrest for first degree
murder."
Montejo: .. . now, I know you aren't that bad a people and
all . . ." (both detectives stand and turn toward exit)

Detective Major: (interrupting) "Dude, you don't want to talk
to us no more, you want a lawyer, right? I trusted you and you
let me down."
Montejo: "No, come here, come here."
Detective Major: "No, no, I can't."
Montejo: "No, come here. . ."
Detective Major: "No, you've asked for an attorney, and you
are getting your charge. And the shame of it is ...
Montejo: "I don't want no attorney."
State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1246-48 (La. 2008), vacated by Montejo,
129 S. Ct. 2079. The police then consulted with a supervisor to confirm that they
could legally interrogate Montejo since he revoked his request. They then readministered Miranda warnings. Shortly after signing the Miranda waivers,
Montejo, appearing tearful, lowered his head and said "What am I doing?" Id. In
the above example, although Montejo was clearly given the right to cut off
questioning by requesting a lawyer, the police waited until his request to place
him under arrest for first-degree murder. Not surprisingly, this move by the
police sent a clear message, as shortly after making his request, Montejo
completely changed his mind to the point that he began "to literally beg" the
police to resume questioning. Id. Clearly, this is one example that the Court's
assertion-that "a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without
counsel present need only say as much"-is a gross oversimplification of the
realities of interrogation. For further reading on the realities of police
interrogation, see Richard A. Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 266, 301 (1996) (conducting an empirical study on 182
personally observed interrogations and concluding that "the gap in our
knowledge between legal ideals and empirical realities remains as wide as ever
in the study of American police interrogation").
181. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839,
859 (1996); Saul M. Kassin et al., PoliceInterviewing and Interrogation:A Self-
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include lying about the existence of incriminating evidence,
minimizing the seriousness of the offense, and insisting that
speaking with the police is in the suspect's best interests.182
Despite the deceptive nature of these practices, courts have
generally admitted confessions obtained through such tactics,
absent a showing of true coercion, such as the use of threats or
violence.183 Although it can be argued that such deceptive behavior

is appropriate in the pre-indictment investigative stage, it should be
considered unacceptable in a Sixth Amendment setting when the
law should be most concerned with preserving the integrity of our
adversarial system.184 Because "sixth amendment counsel waiver
engenders undeniable risks of an unfair trial," "it is necessary to
ensure that an alleged waiver of sixth amendment protection truly
is a choice to exercise the freedom to control one's destiny." 85 A
Miranda waiver, especially when given in response to deceptive
police practices, does not meet this standard and should therefore

Report Survey of Police Practicesand Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381,
389 (2007); Leo, supra note 180, at 276.
182. See Kassin et al., supra note 181, at 386-87; Leo, supra note 180, at
278; see also Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the
Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 808-16 (2006) (noting that the most widely used
police interrogation manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS (Jones & Bartlett Publishers 4th ed. 2004), "makes it clear

that employing trickery and deceit is essential to an interrogator's strategy for
eliciting a confession").
183. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); see also Gohara, supra
note 182, at 801-02 (listing several examples of ways that lower courts "have
applied and expanded on the Supreme Court's tolerance of deceptive police
practices to induce confessions").
184. Some commentators have called for reform of police interrogation
tactics in light of recent discoveries of the numbers of defendants who have been
convicted based on false confessions. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A.
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv.
891 (2004) (analyzing 125 proven false confessions); Gohara, supra note 182;
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and MiscarriagesofJustice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (analyzing 60 proven
false confessions). This Comment does not conclude that such false confessions
are a common result of police practices or that they alone provide sufficient
reason for limiting the strategies of law enforcement. Rather, this Comment
maintains that the existence of any false confessions, no matter how great in
number, should give courts reason to pause and conduct greater examination of
the appropriateness of modem police interrogation tactics and of courts'
willingness to subject defendants to such tactics without the aid of counsel.
185. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1055.
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be considered insufficient to indicate a valid Sixth Amendment
waiver.
One of the most troubling aspects of Montejo is the fact that the
Court made these severe departures from traditional Sixth
Amendment rationale to correct a "problem of its own
The Court's chief justification for overturning
imagining."'
Jackson was its belief that the precedent was unworkable in the
nation's "automatic appointment" states. 8'1 However, the Court
provided no evidence that any court other than the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Montejo and the Fifth Circuit in Montoya had
actually adopted such a narrow and unworkable interpretation of
Jackson.'8 8 In fact, only a "minority of courts require[d] a more
exacting standard of invocation" such as the standard of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Montejo.'8 On the other hand, the
majority of courts in "automatic appointment" states had adopted a
more workable standard, holding that something less than an
express request for the appointment of counsel could trigger
Jackson's cut-off rule. 190 The holdings of these courts are
consistent with the Supreme Court's pre-Montejo precedent. 19 '
Nevertheless, the Montejo Court, without analyzing lower courts'
actual applications of Jackson or giving weight to the claims of the
many law enforcement amici who defended the workability of
Jackson,19 2 declared the case's cut-off rule to be unworkable.193
Such a view of Jackson ignores the reality that most courts have
applied the case in ways that are workable in both "appointment by
request" states and "automatic appointment" states.
B. What's Next? ProblematicSixth Amendment Scenarios After
Montejo
Montejo makes it clear that a court's appointment of counsel,
in response to the defendant's request or otherwise, will not
prevent a defendant from giving a valid Sixth Amendment waiver
in response to police-initiated interrogation. However, much of
186. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2095 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
187. See supraPart III.
188. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079.
189. JEZIC, supra note 15, § 20:15 (2008 ed. 2008); see supra note I10.
190. See supra note 110.
191. See supra note 120 (discussing relevant language in Patterson, Moran,
and Harvey).
192. See Thompson Brief, supranote 159.
193. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2088.
194. See supra note 110.
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Montejo's language suggests that the Supreme Court would not
limit this holding to the particular facts of that case. Additional
examples of police conduct that might now be considered
permissible in light of Montejo are discussed below.
Scenario 1. Montejo on remand: May police lie to a represented
defendant by telling him that he has not been appointed counsel?
The likely answer is yes. The Louisiana Supreme Court was
faced with this issue on remand, where Montejo's claim included
"his argument that the waiver was invalid because it was based on
misrepresentations by police as to whether he had been appointed a

lawyer."l

95

After the Court ruled that Montejo would be able to pursue this
avenue of relief, without explanation it cited the portion of
Moranl96 which noted "that once the [Sixth Amendment] right has
attached, it follows that the police may not interfere with the
efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a "'medium" between
[the suspect] and the State' during the interrogation."' 97 The
implications of the Court's citation to Moran are unclear.
Advocates and commentators have often relied on the above
language from Moran as reinforcing the idea that police conduct
that is permissible in the Miranda context will not always be
permissible in the Sixth Amendment context.198 However, after
Montejo, this view no longer seems to hold water, for the Montejo
Court unequivocally stated that "doctrines ensuring voluntariness
of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the
voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver."l 99
This statement undoubtedly implies that police will be allowed
to lie to an indicted defendant about whether he has been appointed
counsel. After all, the principal holding of Moran was that police
deception would not affect the voluntariness of a Fifth Amendment
waiver as long as "a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was
uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and
request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to

195. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092; see supra note 88. However, on remand,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Montejo was precluded from raising this
objection. See supra note 146.
196. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
428-29 (1986)).
197. Moran, 475 U.S. at 428-29 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
198. See, e.g., supra note 120 (discussing petitioner's arguments in Montejo).
199. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090.
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use his statements to secure a conviction."200 In other words, "as
long as the warnings are given and the suspect exhibits no overt
signs of a lack of capacity to understand them, his waiver will be
upheld," and police will be given wide leeway to employ
questionable interrogation tactics. 20 1 These standards apparently
now apply to the Sixth Amendment as well.20 2 Therefore, in future
cases, courts will likely admit a confession that was obtained
subsequent to a Miranda waiver even when the police lied to the
defendant about whether he had been appointed counsel.
Scenario 2. Moran revisited: May police deceive an indicted
defendant's attorney?
Again, the likely answer is yes. Lying to the defendant's
attome was one of the elements of police misconduct analyzed in
Moran. 03 In that case, the police deceptively told the suspect's
attorney that there was no need to come to the police station
because the police would not be questioning the suspect until the
next day. 2 04 One hour later, the police administered a Miranda
warning, interrogated the suspect, and obtained a confession. 205
Because the suspect had not yet been indicted, his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached.2 0 6 Therefore, the
Supreme Court analyzed the suspect's waiver on Fifth Amendment
grounds and found that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence
of the suspect and entirely unknown to him" did not yrevent the
suspect from giving a knowing and voluntary waiver. 2 However,
as discussed in the previous fact pattern, the Moran Court
suggested that if the suspect had been indicted, the result would
have been different; for once a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights attach, the Court reasoned, "the police may not interfere with
the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a "'medium" between
[the suspect] and the State' during the interrogation." 208
After Montejo, this no longer seems to be true. As previously
discussed, the Montejo majority seems to view the Sixth
200. Moran, 475 U.S. at 422-23. For the full quote from Moran, see supra
text accompanying note 53.
201. Berger,supra note 54, at 1063.

202. See supra text accompanying note 199.
203.

Moran, 475 U.S. at 415.

204. Id.
205. Id. at 417-18.
206. Id. at 428-32.
207. Id. at 422.
208. Id. at 428 (alteration in original) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 176 (1985)).
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Amendment's role at interrogation purely as an anti-compulsion
safeguard; 209 therefore, it is difficult to imagine the rationale upon
which the Court would rely in finding a Sixth Amendment
violation when police interfere with an attorney's efforts to reach
his client. As the Court reasoned in Moran, such actions have no
effect on the voluntariness of a defendant's Fifth Amendment
waiver. 210 Thus, if the Court truly believes that "doctrines ensuring
voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously
ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver," 211 it
seems likely that because Moran-type deception of a defendant's
attorney does not affect the validity of a Fifth Amendment waiver,
courts will also find that such deception does not affect the validity
of a Sixth Amendment waiver.
Scenario 3. State v. Forbush: May police approach an indicted
defendant for interrogation when they are aware that he has
personally retainedcounsel?
Based on the language of Montejo and a ruling from the Court
of Appeals of Wisconsin, the answer seems to be yes. 212 In this
scenario, courts will likely allow the police to initiate interrogation
of an indicted defendant in the absence of counsel-provided that
the defendant gives a valid Miranda waiver-even when the police
know that the defendant has personally retained an attorney.
Before Montejo, most courts would have likely considered this a
the Sixth Amendment based on the holdings of many
violation of21324
state courts
and dicta of the Supreme Court.2 14 After Montejo,
this is no longer the case. The rationale of Montejo suggests that
police are not prohibited from approaching a defendant for the
purpose of interrogation when that defendant retains an attorney,
even if that attorney notifies the police that he will be representing
the defendant. Montejo suggests that there is only one way for a
defendant to invoke a cut-off rule to prevent police from
approaching him for interrogation: the defendant must invoke his
Miranda-Edwardsright "when he is first approached [by police]
209. See supra Part IV.A.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
211. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009).
212. State v. Forbush, 779 N.W.2d 476 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009), appeal
docketed, No. 2008 AP 3007-CR (Wis. Mar. 16, 2010).
213. See supra note 110.
214. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985) ("[P]olice have an
affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby
dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel."); see also supra note
120.
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and given the Miranda warnings."2 15 Therefore, according to the
Court, "it should be clear" that the theory "that no represented
defendant can ever be approached by the State and asked to
consent to interrogation ... is off the mark." 2 16
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Montejo, the Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin addressed this issue in Forbush.2 17 In that
case, before police interrogated Forbush, the defendant's lawyer
called the district attorney to alert him that he was representing
Forbush.2 1 8 The court held that even in such a scenario, in light of
Montejo, the Sixth Amendment does not prevent police from
approaching an indicted defendant for interrogation. 2 1 This result
is consistent with the language of Montejo.2 20
Scenario 4. Hughen v. Texas: May police approach an indicted
defendant for interrogation when the defendant has invoked his
right to counsel in response to court-administered Miranda
warnings?
According to the language of Montejo and a ruling from the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the answer appears to be
yes. 22 1 The Montejo Court noted that Jackson's cut-off rule
215. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090. Notably, even for defendants who
expressly request an attorney, the protections of the Edwards cut-off rule may
only be temporary. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (holding
that the Edwards cut-off rule ceases to apply if there is a break in custody lasting
14 days or longer).
216. Id. at 2086.
217. Forbush, 779 N.W.2d 476.
218. Id. at 477.
219. Id. at 479. As of September 30, 2010, Forbush is pending on appeal
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In his brief and at oral argument, the
defendant urged the Wisconsin Supreme Court to adhere to earlier state
precedent rather than follow Montejo:
Judge: "Ijust want to clarify something. If we just applied the
United States Supreme Court decision, you lose?"
Attorney for the defendant: "I believe that is correct-"
Judge: "Ok, just, straight out-"
Attorney for the defendant: "Yes."
Judge: "You had a gulp, but, you lose. That's why you're
putting [your argument] on the state constitution."
Attorney for the defendant: "Yes."
Oral Argument at 12:28, Forbush,No. 2008 AP 3007-CR, availableat
http://www.wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm (search "2008AP3007"
under "Docket number"); see also State v. Dagnall, 612 N.W.2d 680 (Wis.
2000).
220. See supratext accompanying notes 215-16.
221. Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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prevented police from initiating interrogation after defendants
request court-appointed counsel "despite doubt that defendants
'actually inten[d] their request for counsel to encompass
representation during any further questioning."' 222 But what about
a scenario in which there is no doubt that a defendant's request for
counsel encompassed representation during questioning? Some
states mandate that Miranda warnings be administered by the court
at a defendant's initial appearance. 2 In such a scenario, when a
court informs the defendant of his right to be assisted by counsel
during interrogation, and the defendant requests the appointment of
counsel expressly for that purpose, will the defendant's request
constitute an Edwards invocation? Based on the dicta of Montejo,
the answer seems to be no.
The Court noted that it has "never held that a person can
invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
'custodial interrogation' . . . . What matters for Miranda and

Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for
interrogation ... not what happened at any preliminary hearing." 224
Such an approach seems inconsistent with traditional Sixth
Amendment waiver jurisprudence, in which the Court has held that
judges should "indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."2 2 5 Thus, it seems
illogical to find a valid waiver of the right to counsel from a
defendant who has previously expressed to a court his desire to
enjoy the assistance of counsel at interrogation. If the Court
maintains that a defendant can only invoke the Edwards cut-off
rule after the police administer a Miranda warning, it seems that
the Court is really saying that no matter what intentions the
defendant has expressed to a court, police will always be allowed
one free shot to obtain a Mirandawaiver.
Such an approach seems inconsistent not only with Sixth
Amendment rationale, but also with the rationale behind the
Miranda decision. The Court crafted the Miranda warnings to
protect suspects from being compelled to incriminate themselves
while immersed in a police-dominated environment.22 6 Therefore,
it would seem sensible to allow a defendant to decide whether or
not to invoke his Mirandaright to counsel while he stands before a
222. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632-33 (1986), overruled
by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079).
223. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (West Supp. 2010).
224. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
226. See supra discussion Part II.B.
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neutral magistrate, in an environment where he can rationally
weigh his options without the pressures of police interrogation
tactics. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas recently addressed
this issue and held that after Montejo, a defendant's request to a
court for the assistance of counsel during interrogation will not
constitute an Edwards invocation.2 2 7 Although this result is
inconsistent with the traditional high standards for the waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the decision nevertheless
seems consistent with the language of Montejo.228
Scenario 5. May police interrogatean indicted defendant in a noncustodialsetting without administeringMirandawarnings?
In another dramatic shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,
the answer seems to be yes. This possibility was first raised by
Montejo in his brief:
227. Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). But see
Pecina v. State, No. 2-05-456-CR, 2010 WL 2825663 (Tex. App. July 15, 2010).
The facts of Pecina closely resemble those of Hughen. Pursuant to Texas law, a
magistrate recited the Miranda warnings to Pecina at his arraignment, and
Pecina requested an attorney. Id. at *2. However, unlike in Hughen, Pecina's
arraignment did not occur in a courtroom; rather, because Pecina had suffered a
serious knife wound, a magistrate conducted the arraignment in Pecina's
hospital room. Id. Police officers accompanied the magistrate on this visit and
waited outside the hospital room as the magistrate conducted the arraignment.
Id. Once Pecina requested counsel and the proceeding concluded, the magistrate
exited the room and the police entered. Id. at *3. They recited the Miranda
rights to Pecina; Pecina signed a Miranda waiver and confessed to committing
the crime. Id. The Court of Appeals of Texas suppressed this confession. The
court held that the magistrate was acting on behalf of the police officers;
therefore, the court reasoned, Pecina's request to the magistrate for an attorney
constituted an Edwards invocation, barring the police from initiating
interrogation. Id. at *9-12. However, the court's holding is a questionable
interpretation of Montejo. See id. at *16-20 (Holman, J., dissenting). As the
Pecina dissent points out, the magistrate recited the Miranda rights to the
defendant as part of a preliminary hearing under Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure article 15.17. Pecina, 2010 WL 2825663, at *16-20. Montejo
suggests that such a request to a magistrate does not constitute an Edwards
invocation. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091 ("We have in fact never held that a
person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
'custodial interrogation' . . . . What matters for Miranda and Edwards is what
happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation . . . not what

happened at any preliminary hearing." (internal quotation marks omitted)). As of
September 30, 2010, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is considering a
Petition for Discretionary Review of Pecina, which the State filed on September
15, 2010. See Case Management, 2D CT. APPEALS, http://www.2ndcoa.courts.
state.tx.us/opinions/case.asp?FilinglD=19823 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
228. See supra text accompanying note 224.
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The fact that Miranda-Edwardsapplies only to custodial
interrogations may cause further confusion. Under Jackson,
the police may not show up at the home of a counseled
defendant to question him after the Sixth Amendment right
has attached, even if that questioning were found to be noncustodial. If Jackson were replaced by Miranda, it is not
clear whether the police would even need to give a
Mirandawarning absent a custodial interrogation.
The Montejo Court, after explaining why Miranda-Edwards
would be sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, addressed Montejo's concern:
Montejo also correctly observes that the Miranda-Edwards
regime is narrower than Jackson in one respect: The former
applies only in the context of custodial interrogation. If the
defendant is not in custody then those decisions do not
apply; nor do they govern other, noninterrogative types of
interactions between the defendant and the State (like
pretrial lineups). However, those uncovered situations are
the least likely to pose a risk of coerced waivers. When a
defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only
shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering. And
noninterrogative interactions with the State do not involve
the "inherently compelling pressures" that one might
reasonably fear could lead to involuntary waivers.23 0
The Court made this observation and moved on to another
issue without any further explanation. 23 1 Although the implications
of the Court's above observation are not completely clear, it
certainly seems that the Court is indeed saying that absent both
custody and interrogation, Miranda warnings will not be required,
even in the Sixth Amendment setting. Such a rule would be
problematic because without a Miranda warning, an indicted
defendant's decision to speak to the police-who intend to elicit
responses relating to a formal charge-does not meet even the
relaxed Patterson standard of a knowing and voluntary Sixth
Amendment waiver.232 Without any indication of a knowing and
voluntary waiver by the defendant, how can the Court justify its
above assertion?
229. Opening Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.4, Montejo, 129 S.
Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL 1007120.
230. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (citation omitted) (citing Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
23 1. Id.
232. See supra Part II.D.2.
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The only logical answer seems to once again lie with the
Court's ever-increasing trend of viewing the right to counsel as
simply an anti-coercion safeguard.23 3 Notably, in the above
passage, the Court justifies its position by arguing that scenarios
that do not include both custody and interrogation pose a low risk
of the following dangers: "coerced waivers," "police badgering,"
and "involuntary waivers." 234 But in this list, the Court fails to
include the most obvious danger-a waiver that is not "knowing."
It seems unreasonable to conclude that this omission by the Court
was by accident; for if the Court had acknowledged the
requirement that a waiver be "knowing," it would be impossible
for the Court to justify the assertion that a defendant can give a
valid Sixth Amendment waiver absent the reading of Miranda
warnings. After all, if an indicted defendant is not even given the
knowledge that is conveyed by the Miranda warning, there is no
possible way a court could presume that the defendant "at all times
knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was
aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a

conviction."235
Ultimately, the implications of the above passage of the
Montejo opinion are not quite clear. Although the Court has given
little guidance, it appears that the Court will acknowledge a valid
Sixth Amendment waiver, in at least some circumstances, without
a showing that Miranda warnings were given or that the
defendant's waiver was "knowing." Non-custodial interrogation
appears to be one such instance.23 6

233. See supra Part IV.A. See generally Halama,supranote 11.
234. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090.
235. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1986).
236. With the Court requiring both custody and interrogation for the Miranda
protections to apply in the Sixth Amendment setting, another question arises:
after Montejo, what constitutes interrogation? Traditionally, in Sixth
Amendment contexts, interrogation occurred when the police "deliberately
elicited" a statement from a defendant. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964). This differs from interrogation under the Fifth Amendment, which
is defined as "words or actions on the part of the police that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980). For a discussion of these distinctions, see
Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is
"Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978); Welsh S.
White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209 (1980).
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Scenario 6. May police disregard Massiah by surreptitiously
interrogatingan indicted defendant?
Although the answer currently appears to be no, the rationale
of Montejo presents legitimate reason for concern. As previously
discussed, by overruling a 23-year-old precedent without a
suggestion from either party or any evidence that the precedent had
become unworkable, the Montejo Court displayed an alarming
level of judicial activism. 237 Given the Court's disregard for stare
decisis and its shifting view of the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, 23 8 it seems reasonable to question
whether other fundamental Sixth Amendment holdings are also in
danger. Although the Montejo Court emphasized that the holding
of the Sixth Amendment case Massiah v. United States2 3 9 was not
in doubt, 240 the Court's current view of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel as purely a safeguard against police badgering presents
legitimate reason for concern.
Massiah involved the surreptitious surveillance of an indicted
defendant. 24 1 In that case, the defendant made incriminatinp
statements to a government informant in the absence of counsel. 2
The Court found a Sixth Amendment violation, holding that the
police "deliberately elicited" the statement from Massiah, and
ruled that such action constituted a critical stage during which the
Sixth Amendment applies. 243 Because the defendant was unaware
that he was being monitored, there was no possibility for him to
the
make a knowing and voluntary waiver, and therefore 244
government's actions constituted a Sixth Amendment violation.
However, the police action in Massiah in no way constituted
badgering or coercion and, therefore, did not affect the
voluntariness of the defendant's statements.2 4 5 Given the Montejo
Court's merging of Fifth and Sixth Amendment doctrines and its
view of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as purely a
safeguard against police badgering and involuntary waivers, it

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra text accompanying notes 186-94.
See supra Part IV.A.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009).
Massiah, 377 U.S. 201.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id.
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seems reasonable to question whether Massiah would still be
decided the same way today. 246
In future cases involving the surreptitious interrogation of an
indicted defendant, the Court could continue its trend of merging
Sixth Amendment principles with Miranda doctrine by applying
the rationale of the 1990 case Illinois v. Perkins.247 In Perkins, an
incarcerated suspect whose Sixth Amendment rights had not yet
attached was questioned by an undercover police officer who did
not administer Miranda warnings. 248 The Court ruled that the
questioning did not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation
because the "essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated
atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated
person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow
inmate.
The Court further clarified that "Miranda forbids
coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a
suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow
prisoner."250
Applying such rationale in the Sixth Amendment context
would directly conflict with Massiah and the fundamental notion
that a Sixth Amendment waiver must not only be voluntary, but
also knowing and intelligent. But if the Court continues to view the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel merely as a safeguard against
police badgering, the rationale of Perkins would seem applicable
even in Sixth Amendment contexts. Although the Court has not yet
expressed a willingness to make this extreme departure from Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, the rationale employed in Montejo
presents legitimate reason for concern.
C. Implications ofAbove Scenarios
The Montejo Court's cursory treatment of the role of the right
to counsel has clearly "left lower courts with no reminder of the
importance and intended function of the Sixth Amendment." 25 1
Without the guidance of Jackson's bright-line rule, "lower courts
have been left to chip away at the Sixth Amendment even further

246. See also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), another
surreptitious interrogation case that, like Massiah, could be in danger of being
reexamined in light of Montejo.
247. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
248. Id. at 294-95.
249. Id. at 296.
250. Id. at 297.
251. Halama,supra note 11, at 1223.
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than the Supreme Court has been willing to permit." 25 2 After
Montejo, courts are left with essentially two options.
First, courts can conduct a wholesale importation of Miranda
jurisprudence into the Sixth Amendment; implementing the Fifth
Amendment standards to which prosecutors and defense attorneys
are already accustomed would provide relatively predictable
results. However, this option would belittle the importance of the
Sixth Amendment, ensuring only that waivers of the right to
counsel are not coerced instead of protecting the Sixth
25
A wholesale importation could also
Amendment's true purpose.25
lead to the undermining of fundamental Sixth Amendment cases
such as Massiah.
As a second option, courts could follow Montejo by allowing
police to approach indicted defendants for interrogation, while at
the same time requiring law enforcement to meet a higher burden
of proving a knowing and voluntary waiver by defendants.
Implementing requirements similar to the Zerbst-Faretta
standard 254 would help to preserve the sanctity of the right to
counsel; however, analysis of such a waiver standard would
undoubtedly be complex and could prove difficult to implement
into the everyday practice of law enforcement.2 5 5
Both of the above options pose serious problems. On the one
hand, a wholesale importation of Miranda jurisprudence would
undermine the protections of the Sixth Amendment, as indicated
by the results of Forbush and Hughen and the problematic
scenarios detailed above. 256 On the other hand, implementation of
a more protective Zerbst-Faretta standard could prove to be
unworkable in everyday law enforcement. To solve this dilemma,
states should amend their constitutions to establish bright-line
standards that both protect the sanctity of the right to counsel and
also provide clear guidance to law enforcement.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR LOUISIANA: AMEND THE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution

currently provides, in pertinent part: "At each stage of the
proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his
252. Id.
253. See supra Part II.A.I.
254. See supra Part II.C.I.
255. See Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1054-59; infra text accompanying
notes 265-67.
256. See supra Part IV.B.
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choice, or appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with
an offense punishable by imprisonment." 2 57 To better protect the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Louisiana could add the
following provision:
Once such protection has attached, and a defendant has
either been appointed counsel by the court, or has otherwise
secured representation for the offense at hand, law
enforcement shall not initiate contact with the defendant for
the purposes of interrogation or other deliberate elicitation
until counsel is present, and a defendant's waiver of the
right to counsel in response to any such contact initiated by
law enforcement will be presumed invalid unless counsel is
present.
This proposed amendment would have the effect of codifying
the Montejo dissent's interpretation of Jackson-"that no
represented defendant can ever be approached by the State and
asked to consent to interrogation." 258 Thus, this amendment would
require that law enforcement officials communicate directly with a
defendant's attorney, as opposed to the represented defendant
himself, in order to initiate discussion about the charges at hand.
Such a requirement would effectively solve the problems posed by
Montejo. In each of the six scenarios detailed above, the
amendment would prevent police from communicating with the
defendant, unless such communication was initiated by the
defendant or his attorney. This represents a return to the
fundamental Sixth Amendment rationale that a criminal defendant
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him" 259 and that counsel "operates to assure
that the accused's interests will be protected consistently with our
adversary theory of criminal prosecution." 260 It would also more
closely align the powers of law enforcement with the Model Rules
ofProfessional Conduct, which were adopted by the American Bar
Association to protect the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship and to prevent overreaching by a party's opponent.2 6 1
257. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
258. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009).
259. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
260. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
261. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2010). See supra
note 15 for the full text of Rule 4.2. Before Montejo, it was generally true that
there existed only "a narrow area where an offense by a prosecutor is not great
enough to violate the constitutional rights of the defendant, but still constitutes
an unethical practice by the prosecutor." Neil Salon, Prosecutors and Model
Rule 4.2: An Examination of Appropriate Remedies, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
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Although the proposed amendment is based in part on
Jackson's cut-off rule, it would not result in the workability
dilemmas that concerned the Montejo Court. Since the amendment
is written to apply to all represented defendants, its protections
would apply equally to defendants in "appointment by request"
states and "automatic appointment" states. And because this rule is
a bright-line standard, it would not only protect the sanctity of the
right to counsel but also provide clear guidance to law
enforcement.
However, as the Montejo Court pointed out, the "value of any
prophylactic rule .

.

. must be assessed not only on the basis of

what is gained, but also on the basis of what is lost." 262 Critics of
broadening the protections of the right to counsel claim that doing
so would frustrate the states' "compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." 263 However,
the proposed amendment would not significantly hinder the efforts
of law enforcement. Many former prosecutors have conceded as
much; when the Supreme Court directed the parties in Montejo to
file supplemental briefs addressing whether Jackson should be
overturned, a group of lawyers and judges with extensive
experience in law enforcement filed an amici brief on behalf of
Montejo.264 In this brief, they "argue[d] persuasively that
Jackson's bright-line rule has provided law enforcement officers
with clear guidance, allowed prosecutors to quickly and easily
assess whether confessions will be admissible in court, and assisted
judges in determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights have been violated by police interrogation." 2 65 Such an
approach is consistent with the Court's often-expressed view that
"[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers,
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance
the social and individual interests involved in the specific

393, 396-97 (1999). Today, ethical "no contact" rules lie directly at odds with
Montejo.
262. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.
146, 161 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
263. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
264. See Thompson Brief, supra note 159, which was signed by 19 amici
who had previously held positions such as judges, prosecutors, attorneys
general, and other law enforcement executives at the state and federal level;
notably, this list included William Sessions, former Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
265. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson
Brief, supra note 159).
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circumstances they confront." 2 66 The Court has noted that, where
possible, the lawfulness of a police officer's actions should not
depend on a "highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts
of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances
and hairline distinctions,, 267 but on a "straightforward rule, easily
applied, and predictably enforced." 268
Obviously, even accepting the above benefits, bright-line rules
are not appropriate if they significantly frustrate legitimate law
enforcement techniques; however, this would not likely be the case
if the above proposal is adopted. Although the law enforcement
amici in Montejo "acknowledge[d] that 'Jackson reduces
opportunities to interrogate defendants' and 'may require exclusion
of evidence that could support a criminal conviction,' they
maintain that 'it is269a rare case where this rule lets a guilty
defendant go free."'
Even the Solicitor General, in its amicus brief on behalf of
Louisiana, admitted that the Jackson rule "only occasionally
prevents federal prosecutors from obtaining appropriate
convictions."270 Further, the Solicitor General conceded that the
overruling of Jackson "likely would not significantly alter the
manner in which federal law enforcement agents investigate
indicted defendants. Nor has the Jackson rule resulted in the
suppression of significant numbers of statements in federal
prosecutions in the past." 27 1
Thus, the proposed amendment would not only provide for
greater protection of a defendant's right to counsel, but also make
for more workable and efficient law enforcement. Maintaining a
bright-line rule in this area of the law will also prevent the
consequences that could result when lower courts and law
enforcement test the new Sixth Amendment standards.2 7 2
266. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979); see also
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1222-23 (2010) (holding that the
Edwards cut-off rule ceases to apply if there is a break in custody lasting 14
days or longer and explaining that "law enforcement officers need to know, with
certainty and beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful").
267. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (quoting New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Belton, 453 U.S. at 459.
269. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson
Brief, supranote 159).
270. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 105, at 3.
271. Id. at 12.
272. See supra Part IV.B; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 2.9(g) (2009), Westlaw 1 CRIMPROC s 2.9(g) ("[C]ommentators
find implicit in the Warren Court rulings an additional concern that state judges
were insensitive to constitutional claims . .

..

Per se prohibitions were viewed as
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VI. CONCLUSION
Sherman McCoy sits idly in the courtroom of Judge Myron
Kovitsky, praying that his attorney can remedy his foolish decision
to speak to the police.
"Detective Martin, when you and Detective Goldberg
questioned my client, you were aware that he had retained a
lawyer, isn't that right?" McCoy's attorney asks.
"Look, we didn't make McCoy say anything," Martin replies.
"We were just doing3 some good old-fashioned police work, the
only kind we know.
These cops knew exactly what they were doing, Judge Kovitsky
thinks to himself but am I really going to let a criminal run free
because of it?
Montejo has left judges without clear standards for evaluating a
Montejo's holding not
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
only overturned a constitutional safeguard that was both valuable
to defendants and workable for law enforcement, but also
displayed a complete disregard for the traditional rationale behind
the Sixth Amendment.2 7 5 The Court's drastic importation of Fifth
Amendment rationale into Sixth Amendment contexts might
ensure that confessions are given voluntarily, but it does not
protect the broader goal of the Sixth Amendment-minimizing the
imbalance in our adversary system to ensure that defendants
receive fair trials. 276
The Montejo Court's distortion of these principles has resulted
in a blurring of the line between legitimate law enforcement efforts
and illegitimate police deception, as illustrated by the case of
Sherman McCoy in the aforementioned scenario. When lower
courts and law enforcement are faced with such facts, they will be
tempted, in light of Montejo, to "chip away at the Sixth
Amendment even further than the Supreme Court has been willing

responsive to . . . these difficulties. They produced clear standards that were

readily comprehensible, and provided less room for manipulation by judges
disposed to evasion . . . .").

273. See Nick Lamberto, Leaming's "Speech": "I'd Do It Again," DES
MOINES REG., Apr. 7, 1977, at Bl, where Captain Leaming said of Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), "Shucks, I was just being a good old-fashioned
cop, the only kind I know how to be," reminiscing on his "Christian burial
speech." See Kamisar, supra note 236, at 1.
274. See supra Part IV.C.
275. See supra Part IV.
276. See supra Part IV.A.
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to permit."277 To prevent further denigration of the right to counsel,
states should amend their constitutions to include bright-line
protections similar to those of Jackson. This would provide for
greater protection of a defendant's right to counsel, ensure a more
workable and efficient system of law enforcement, and help to
defend the integrity of our adversarial system of justice. Without
such action, a defendant's trust in the attorney-client relationship
will be misplaced, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel will
truly become "a trap for the unwary." 278
Michael C Mims*

277. Halama, supra note 11, at 1223.
278. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 32.
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